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ABSTRACT
THE IMPACT OF CONDITIONAL CASH TRANSFER PROGRAMS UNDER
RISK-SHARING ARRANGEMENTS: SCHOOLING AND CONSUMPTION
SMOOTHING IN RURAL MEXICO
Eun-young Shim
Kenneth I. Wolpin
This paper develops and estimates a model of informal risk sharing with limited com-
mitment that incorporates children’s school attendance choices. The model is estimated
using Mexican rural villages data from the PROGRESA experiment and is used to analyze
how the presence of informal risk sharing influences schooling and child labor choices,
as well as the effectiveness of conditional cash transfer (CCT) programs. In particular, I
compare the outcomes (schooling, child labor, and consumption) generated under the in-
formal risk-sharing model with those that would be obtained, forcing households to make
choices under autarky. I evaluate the effect of alternative program designs that were also
considered in other papers which did not incorporate inter-household transfers. I find that
the number of years of schooling completed at age 18 is 0.5 years lower under autarky
than with risk sharing. Also, the effect of CCT on schooling outcomes and welfare of
households is larger under autarky than under risk sharing, and CCT increases consump-
tion volatility under risk sharing, especially among households with young children who
are subject to the future program benefit.
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1 Introduction
Over recent decades, many developing countries have adopted conditional cash transfer
(CCT) programs as a new approach to reducing poverty and increasing the human capital
of the next generation. These programs give cash grants to poor households conditional
on children’s school attendance. In 1997, the Mexican government initiated one of the
first programs, which is called the Programa de Educación, Salud y Alimentación, or
PROGRESA (the current program is named Oportunidades), and similar programs were
adopted throughout Central and Latin America and, more recently, in South East Asia and
Africa (Fiszbein and Schady, 2009). The randomized implementation of PROGRESA
and its collection of extensive data offered researchers unique opportunities to evaluate
the program’s effectiveness and to study alternative program subsidy designs (Attanasio,
Meghir, and Santiago, 2012; Behrman, Sengupta, and Todd, 2005; Schultz, 2004, Todd
and Wolpin, 2006, among others).
Most of the existing studies of the effects of CCT programs on child schooling have
modeled the behavior of households without regard to transfers between households and
have focused on short-term program effects. An important reality of the lives of poor
families in developing countries is that, in the absence of formal lending opportunities,
they manage income risk through transfers among relatives and neighbors, often referred
to as “informal risk sharing” (see Fafchamps, 2008, for the survey). There is evidence that
public transfers that are targeted to specific groups, such as old age pension programs or
conditional cash transfers, are shared by others through informal risk sharing and crowd
out existing informal transfers (Albarran and Attanasio, 2003; Angelucci and Di Giorgi,
2009; Dercon and Krishnan, 2003; Jensen, 2004). The treatment effects estimated with
experimental treatment and control groups, such as those obtained under the PROGRESA
experiment, are robust as to whether informal risk sharing is taking place. However, stud-
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ies that develop structural models to evaluate the effects of alternative program designs,
and which assume that households face only household-level income constraints, may not
fully capture program effects.1 Moreover, most of the CCT literature focuses on short-
term program effects, as the data are usually only available for a few years. The longer-
term effects may be different from observed short-term effects, as households adjust their
risk-sharing behavior in response to both the transfers and to additional changes in the
level and variability of income arising from children’s increased schooling.2 At the sub-
sistence level, managing income risk is crucial for the ability of households to meet their
daily basic needs, and thus, understanding the change in informal risk sharing behavior is
important in evaluating the welfare effect of the CCT programs. Also, financial constraint
is an important determinant of a child schooling and labor choice, and these outcomes
may respond to the change in the availability of informal transfers (Jacoby, 1994; Jacoby
and Skoufias, 1997).
This paper develops and estimates a model of informal risk sharing with limited com-
mitment that incorporates children’s school attendance choices. My model builds on and
extends the earlier informal village risk-sharing models introduced in Townsend (1994),
on the limited commitment framework developed in Ligon, Thomas, and Worrall (2000,
2002), Laczó (2011), and on the large economy model of Krueger and Perri (2011). The
model is estimated using data from the PROGRESA experiment and is used to analyze
how the presence of informal risk sharing influences the effectiveness of CCT programs.
In particular, I compare the treatment outcomes (schooling, consumption, and income)
generated under the informal risk sharing model with those that would be obtained forc-
ing households to make choices under autarky. I quantify the effect of informal risk
1The notable exceptions are Angelucci, Di Giorgi, Rangel, and Rasul (2010), and Angelucci, Di Giorgi,
and Rasul (2012).
2Attanasio and Rios-Rull (2000) and Krueger and Perry (2006, 2011) show that lower income variability
may reduce consumption risk sharing.
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sharing and study the mechanisms through which risk sharing promotes schooling attain-
ment. I evaluate the effect of alternative program designs which were also considered in
other papers that did not incorporate inter household transfers (Attanasio, Meghir, and
Santiago, 2012; Todd and Wolpin, 2006).
In the model, I consider a closed village economy, populated by a continuum of over-
lapping generations of households who make a collective decisions about (1) the size of
the transfers given to or received by each household, and (2) which households send their
child to school. The arrangement is based on the households’ voluntary incentive to share
their income with others, and hence, the arrangement is made in such a way that the fu-
ture gain from staying in the arrangement relative to autarky is sufficient to compensate
for the amount households have to share in the current period. Incorporating this so-called
limited-commitment constraint, the arrangement endogenously responds to the expected
and the actual changes in the autarky value driven by government transfers.3
Households begin their lifecycle as a married couple, and, with some probability,
a child birth occurs. Children are eligible to attend school between ages of 6 and 18,
during which time they can either choose to stay home, attend school, or work for a
child labor wage. There is a utility cost of returning to school after an interruption of
school attendance. Parents’ income and child wage offers are exogenous and stochastic,
and household income is pooled. Children aged 19 and over are assumed to work, and
household income depends on child schooling attainment. Household income may also
differ across households according to permanent unobserved types of parents and children
which are incorporated into the model.
Households have an incentive to participate in risk sharing mainly for two reasons.
First, households are risk averse and want to smooth their consumption against future
3Albarran and Attanasio (2003) find evidence that the limited-commitment constraint is present in these
villages.
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shocks. Second, schooling interruptions are costly, so parents have an incentive to keep
their child in school even in periods where they receive negative income shocks.
Directly solving for the allocation for all households for all possible states is not fea-
sible. However, a solution can be found by solving a contract between a household and an
infinitely-lived, risk-neutral agent (see Atkeson and Lucas, 1992, 1995; and Krueger and
Perri, 2011). The advantage of this algorithm is that it reduces the original problem to a
recursive cost minimization problem of the risk-neutral agent, who is committed to deliver
a certain level of lifetime utility (which is promised in the contract) to a given household
without having to track the distribution of the allocations received by all households. This
approach requires assuming that the village economy is stationary.
In 1997, the Mexican government launched a large-scale cash transfer program tar-
geting the rural poor. The program, which was called PROGRESA, paid a cash grant
to mothers upon the school attendance of their children, and detailed panel data were
collected to evaluate the program. The data includes 25,000 households in 506 villages,
and all households in selected villages were surveyed. Thus, I observe the information of
all households that would participate in the risk-sharing arrangement. The data contain
detailed information about household income and consumption and also about the age,
completed school grade, main activity, and wage income earned by each household mem-
ber. Among the 506 villages, 186 were selected as control villages, and the CCT program
for them was delayed until the end of 1999. In estimation, I use the 11 largest control vil-
lages, which have more than 100 households each.4 The model parameters are estimated
by the simulated method of moments, matching the observed income, consumption, and
child activity choices predicted by the model to those in the PROGRESA data.
4I restrict the sample to large control villages for two reasons. First, the model assumes a continuum
of households, which is approximated better by large villages. Second, the model solution algorithm the
economy to be stationary. However, due to introduction of the transfer program, in the treatment villages the
village economy may be in a transition path to a different equilibrium than the one in the control villages.
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Based on the estimated model, I find that informal risk sharing promotes more reg-
ular school attendance for children and helps households smooth consumption against
income shocks. When households engage in risk sharing, school attendance and child
labor choices are not responsive to parental income fluctuations, whereas in autarky, they
are significantly affected by them. A temporary decrease in parental income leads to a
school enrollment rate that is 12 percentage points lower under autarky than with risk
sharing. Due to high estimated adjustment costs, only a small fraction of children return
to school once schooling is interrupted. Under autarky, the impact of a low income shock
in one year is persistent. I find that the amount of schooling completed by children by the
age of 19 is 0.47 years less under autarky than with risk sharing.
I also introduce a CCT program that is similar to PROGRESA to the estimated model
with and without risk sharing and find that the effect of the CCT program on schooling
outcomes and household welfare is larger under autarky than under risk sharing. Com-
pared to when there is no CCT program, the amount of schooling completed by children
by the age of 19 increases by 1.12 years under autarky and by 0.85 years under risk shar-
ing. School enrollment rate increases by 23 percentage points under autarky and by 19
percentage points under risk sharing. One of the benefits of CCT is that it mitigates the
effect of negative income shocks on household consumption and school attendance. This
effect, however, is negligible under risk sharing because the allocations under risk shar-
ing were close to efficient allocations even without the CCT. Moreover, the correlation
between household income and consumption under risk sharing increases by 13 percent
compared to when there is no CCT. This is because beneficiary households can rely on
the CCT benefit if inter-household transfer becomes unavailable, and this weakens their
voluntary participation incentive to remain in the risk-sharing arrangement. This offsets
some of the welfare gains from the CCT under risk sharing.
This paper relates to a large literature that evaluates the effects of the PROGRESA
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program, especially to Attanasio, Meghir, and Santiago (2012) and Todd and Wolpin
(2006), both of which use a structural modeling approach to model schooling decisions.
Both papers evaluate the effects of alternative policies that involve reallocating program
benefits among households. My modeling framework is much different in that it is an
equilibrium model that allows for transfers among households. I examine how policy
effects differ in an environment where households make or receive transfers and jointly
make schooling decisions relative to an autarky environment.
Other closely related papers are Angelucci, Di Giorgi, Rangel, and Rasul (2010) and
Angelucci, Di Giorgi, and Rasul (2013). These papers find that the PROGRESA program
was effective in increasing child schooling only for the households which have extended
family network ties within the same village, suggesting that informal risk sharing plays
an important role. This paper takes an alternative approach by developing and estimating
a model that allows the amount of risk sharing within each village to be endogenously
determined. This approach is more flexible when it comes to an evaluation of alternative
policies by allowing risk sharing outcomes to vary depending on the nature of each policy.
Several papers structurally estimate dynamic risk-sharing models with limited com-
mitment using village-level data. Ligon, Thomas, and Worrall (2002) find that estimated
model explains the consumption dynamics in rural Indian villages better than alternative
models, including autarky and a static risk-sharing model. Laczó (2011) formally ap-
plies statistical tests to different risk sharing regimes using the same Indian villages data
and finds that limited commitment with heterogenous preference outperforms alternative
models. She also studies the effect of a counterfactual public cash transfer policy on the
risk-sharing arrangement. Their analysis is confined to consumption risk sharing and does
not incorporate schooling or any other investment decision.
Ligon, Thomas, and Worrall (2000) consider a limited-commitment risk-sharing model
with private savings that cannot be seized as collateral. In a numerical simulation, they
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show that the existence of savings helps to smooth aggregate shocks, but it may decrease
welfare by making the outside option more attractive. My model does not incorporate
savings (very few households in the data have savings), but I instead incorporate the
schooling decision as a form of investment. Schooling differs from savings or other phys-
ical capital because schooling investments have to be made continuously during a specific
interval of the lifecycle, and households receive direct utility from schooling. An impli-
cation of my model is that households which want to invest in schooling demand more
risk sharing.
This paper is also related to a large literature on informal risk sharing in rural village
economies that originated with Townsend (1994), who studied risk sharing among vil-
lagers in rural India. Since then, numerous papers have documented similar behaviors
in many different countries (Dercon and Krishnan, 2003; Fafchamps and Lund, 2003;
Kinnan, 2011; Mazzocco and Saini, 2009; and Morduch, 1995, among others). Cox and
Fafchamps (2007) and Fafchamps (2008) provide extensive reviews of the literature on
informal risk sharing and evidence of crowding out of public transfers found in the liter-
ature.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The model is presented in section 2. Sec-
tion 3 provides a description of the data. Section 4 introduces estimation procedure and
results. Section 5 presents the description and the analysis of counterfactual experiments,
and section 6 concludes.
2 Model
In the following subsections I first set up the model environment, including the village and
household demographics and the choices and risks which these households face. Then I
formally define an allocation under risk sharing with limited commitment. To solve for
7
an efficient allocation under risk sharing, I introduce an agent who mediates interaction
among households. The agent’s problem is presented at the end of this section.
2.1 Set-up
2.1.1 Village and Household Demographics
I consider a closed village economy, populated by a continuum of overlapping generations
of households. The life of a household begins without a child. A household is endowed
with some level of lifetime utility ω0 and unobserved type ptype. Fertility shocks arrive
once a year, and a childbirth occurs with probability πb. Once a child is born, the fertility
process ends. Children between the ages of 6 and 18 are eligible to attend school. After a
child reaches age 19, he or she is no longer eligible to attend school, and instead always
works and contributes to household income. Children in this stage also may permanently
leave their households and stop contributing to household income with probability πm.
This event is called a “migration” in the remaining of the paper. Households in this stage
(i.e., a household whose grown-up child is no longer present), whose grown-up child is
no longer present, stochastically dissolve with probability πd , after which they do not
consume nor obtain any utility. Dissolved households are replaced by new households so
as to keep the village demography stationary. At any given time period, each village is
populated by households in different stages in their life cycle.
A period in the model equals one school semester (six months), and there are two
periods within one year (fall and spring semester). All demographic transitions including
birth, migration, dissolution, and the evolution of a child’s age occur once a year, in the
beginning of the fall period.5
5The model assumes that each household has at most one child. This is restrictive because households
in rural Mexico have around 3.5 children on average. The benefit of having multiple children in the model
would be that it provides more heterogeneity across households in terms of their demand for risk sharing
with other households. For example, households who have multiple children who can work for wages
8
2.1.2 School Grade Completion and Activity Choices of Children
Children between ages 6 and 11 always attend school. Between ages 12 and 18, they either
stay home, attend school, or work for a wage. These activity choices are mutually exclu-
sive. I define d jt = 1 if alternative j is chosen in period t where j ∈ {home, school, work}.
If alternative j is not chosen, d jt = 0. dt denotes a vector {dhomet ,dschoolt ,dworkt }. School
enrollment choices for a child are made twice a year, at the beginning of the fall and the
spring semesters.
Although children under age 12 always attend school, they may fail their school grade
and need to repeat the year. Rather than modeling that each child completes or fails a
grade every year, the model determines each child’s completed grade at the time the child
turns 12. Define Xct to be the completed grade of a child at the beginning of t. The
probability that Xct = X for X = 0, ...,6 is denoted by π
12
gr (X , ptype):
Pr(Xc12 = X) = π
12
gr (X , ptype)
and the probability sums up to 1, ∑6X=0 π
12
gr (X , ptype) = 1.
Between ages 12 and 18, school grade completion is determined at the end of ev-
ery spring semester. The probability that a grade is completed by a child is a func-
tion of school attendance choices in that year, dschoolt−1 and d
school
t , and is denoted by
πgr(dschoolt ,d
school
t−1 ) .
have better self-insurance ability, which will decrease their voluntary participation incentive to share risk
with others. Also, the maximum amount they can receive when a conditional cash transfer program (CCT)
is introduced will vary depending on the number of the children who are eligible to receive the program
benefit, which implies that the effect of CCT on autarky values differ across households. However, allowing
multiple children in the model is computationally burdensome; therefore, in the current stage of this study,
I limit my model to a single child.
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2.1.3 Type Probability
The probability that a parent or a grown-up child whose completed grade is X is high-
income type is given by:
Pr(type = high|X) = exp(Xγ)
1+ exp(Xγ)
,
where
Xγ ≡ γo + γX X + γ61{X ≥ 6}+ γ91{X ≥ 9}+ γ121{X ≥ 12}.
2.1.4 Income Process
Households face a stochastic income process. This is a major source of risk in the model.
Before a child becomes 12 years of age, his or her parents are the household’s only income
earners. The parental income process is given by the following:
log
(
ypi,v,t
)
= β pv +µ
p
ptypei + ε
p
i,v,t , ε
p
i,v,t ∼ N
(
0,σ2p,v
)
,
where β pv is a village fixed effect, µ
p
ptypei denotes an unobserved parental component
type ptypei, and ε
p
i,v,t is an idiosyncratic shock that is independent over time and across
households. Let a denote the age of a child. The child’s wage process between ages 12
and 18 is given by the following:
log(wi,v,t(a)) = β wa + ε
w
i,v,t , ε
w
i,v,t ∼ N(0,σ2w),
where β wa is an age specific mean and ε
w
i,v,t is an idiosyncratic shock. When a child is
between ages 12 and 18, household income, yhi,v,t , is the sum of the parental income and
the child’s wages:
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yhi,v,t = y
p
i,v,t +wi,v,t1{d
work
t = 1},
ε
p
i,v,t and ε
w
i,v,t are independent of each other. As a child reaches age 19, both the parents
and child jointly generate household income:
log
(
yhi,v,t
)
= β hv +µ
p
ptypei +µ
c
ctypei + ε
h
i,v,t , ε
h
i,v,t ∼ N
(
0,σ2h,v
)
,
where µcctypei denotes an unobserved type component of a child of type ctypei. As parents
and grown-up child start to jointly generate household income, both the parental and the
child type enter the process. If there is no child or a child is below age 12, yhi,v,t = y
p
i,v,t .
2.1.5 Preference
The period utility of household is derived from household consumption, completed school
grade and activity choices of a child:
ui,t = uχ(χi,t)+uX(Xci,t)+uschool(d
school
i,t−1 ,d
school
i,t ,ai,t ,X
c
i,t)+uwork(d
work
i,t ,ai,t), (1)
where
uC(χi,t) =
χ
1−η
i,t −1
1−η
,
and χi,t is a composite good of household consumption and utility derived from the child
leisure given by
χi,t = ci,t +(κhome,a +ξ )1{dhomei,t = 1},
with household consumption ci,t , utility from the child’s leisure, κhome,a and ξ , where
logξ ∼ N(0,σ2
ξ
). Note that κhome,a is age-specific. The utility from leisure can be in-
terpreted as the child’s home production, and its value may change as a child gets older.
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Households are risk averse over χi,t , and their period utility is represented by the constant
relative risk aversion utility function with risk aversion parameter η . uX(Xci,t) denotes the
utility from the completed school grade, Xci,t :
uX(Xci,t) = κ61{Xci,t ≥ 6}+κ91{Xci,t ≥ 9}+κ121{Xci,t ≥ 12}.
uschool(di,t−1,di,t ,ai,t ,Xci,t) denotes the utility cost of attending school:
uschool(di,t−1,di,t ,ai,t ,Xci,t) = κgap11{dschooli,t = 1, ai,t−6−Xci,t > 0}
+ κgap61{dschooli,t = 1, ai,t−6−Xci,t ≥ 6}
+ κgap91{dschooli,t = 1, ai,t−6−Xci,t ≥ 9} (2)
+ κprev1{dschooli,t−1 = 0,dschooli,t = 1}
The top three terms on the right hand side of the equation (2) capture the utility cost
of attending school when a child is behind the standard school grade for his or her age
(ai,t − 6) by at least 1 year, more than 6 years, and more than 9 years, respectively. The
fourth term captures the cost of attending school when a child did not attend the school in
the previous period.
The last term of (1) captures the age-specific cost of working for a wage:
uwork(dworki,t ,ai,t = a) = κwork,a1{dworki,t = 1}
Households discount the future at the rate of δ .
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2.2 Risk Sharing Problem
In this subsection, I formally define efficient allocations under risk sharing with limited
commitment and present the agent’s problem in a recursive formulation. Recall that the
outside option of households is to live under autarky. Therefore, to characterize the vol-
untary participation constraint, I first introduce the autarky problem.
2.2.1 State Space
Let us denote a vector of shocks received by household i in period t by si,t . si,t includes
stochastic events affecting demographic transition (birth, migration, and dissolution),
parental income, child wage, leisure preference, grade completion. A history of si,t up
to period τ is denoted by sτi . Define Ωi,τ to be a state that household i arrived in at the be-
ginning of period τ , consisting of sτi and demographic characteristics including the initial
ex-ante lifetime utility ω0 and the type of parents and a child, ptype and ctype:
Ωi,τ = {ω0, ptypei,ctypei,sτi ,ai,τ ,di,τ−1,Xci,τ}.
Also, denote the set of all Ωi,τ that can be reached with a positive probability in period τ
as Ωτ .
2.2.2 Autarky
Under autarky, households make an optimal choice given their household budget con-
straint, ci,t = yhi,t . The only choice involved under autarky is a child activity choice. The
discounted present lifetime utility of household i which arrived Ωi,t in period t is denoted
as UAut(Ωi,t). For more complete presentation of the autarky problem, see Appendix A.
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2.2.3 Risk Sharing with Limited Commitment
Households have an incentive to participate in risk sharing for two reasons. First, house-
holds are risk averse and want to smooth their consumption against future shocks. Sec-
ond, schooling interruptions are costly, so parents have an incentive to keep their child in
school even in periods where they receive negative income shocks. To manage income
risk, households participate in a risk-sharing arrangement where households pool their
income and make a collective decisions about (1) the size of the inter-household trans-
fers given to or received by each household, and (2) which households send their child to
school.
Households opt out to autarky unless they obtain at least as much utility as they
would without any risk sharing. Also, there is no means by which to enforce this in-
formal contract among the households. The decision whether to remain in or leave the
arrangement is made by each household in the beginning of each period after si,t is re-
alized. The only exception is for the households whose child is between ages 12 and
18. For these households, elements in si,t are realized sequentially. At the beginning of
each period, ε p is realized first, and then {ξ ,εw} follows. The decision whether to re-
main in the arrangement is made after the realization of ε p but before that of {ξ ,εw}.
Thus, they remain in the arrangement if and only if the utility from staying in the ar-
rangement is at least as much as the utility obtained under autarky in expectation over
possible {ξ ,εw} realizations.6 For all households, the decision to remain in the arrange-
ment, once made, binds until the next period ε p is realized. It is assumed that the entire
arrangement breaks down if at least one household chooses to leave the arrangement, and
6If the participation constraint must be satisfied after {ξ ,εw} is realized, the dimension of the problem
substantially increases, which makes the computation too costly. This is because the state-contingent utility
promise has to be made for all possible combinations of {ξ ,εw}, whereas with the current assumption, there
is only one utility promise that needs to be made, which is in expectation over the all possible combinations.
See Appendix for the details related to computational challenges which arise in the agent’s problem.
14
hence, the allocation is constrained to keep every household within the arrangement in
every state in every period. An allocation under the risk sharing arrangement is denoted
by (c,d)≡ {{ci,t(Ωi,t),di,t(Ωi,t)}Ωi,t∈Ωt}∞t=0.
Define u(Ωi,τ ,c,d) to be the period utility of household i in period τ under allocation
(c,d). The constraint to keep households in the arrangement, which will hereafter be
called a voluntary participation constraint (V P), are given by the following:7
u(Ωi,t ,c,d)+
∞
∑
τ=t+1
δ
τ−tEΩi,τ |Ωi,t ,di,t(Ωi,t) [u(Ωi,τ ,c,d)]≥U
Aut(Ωi,t).
There is no village-level aggregate saving or borrowing technology. Thus, in every
period, the sum of the consumption of all households should not exceed the sum of income
of the households in the village. The village resource constraint (RC) is given by,
ˆ
Ωi,t∈Ωt
ci,t(Ωi,t)dΦt(Ωi,t)≤
ˆ
Ωi,t∈Ωt
yhi,t(Ωi,t)dΦt(Ωi,t)∀t,Ωt ,
where Φt(Ωi,t) is a cumulative distribution function of Ωi,t over the support Ωt in period
t. Subject to (V P) and (RC), households in a village in period t jointly maximize the sum
of their discounted present value of lifetime utility:
max
c,d
∞
∑
τ=t
δ
τ−tEsτ |st
{ˆ
Ωi,τ∈Ωτ
u(Ωi,τ ,c,d)dΦτ(Ωi,τ)
}
.
An allocation (c,d) is efficient with respect to Φt if the allocation solves the problem
with (RC) holds at equality. As shown in Atkeson and Lucas (1992, 1995) and Krueger
7For the periods when a child is between age 12 and 18, (V P) is given by the following:
Est |ε p
{
u(Ωi,t ,c,d)+
∞
∑
τ=t+1
δ
τ−tEΩi,τ |Ωi,t ,di,t (Ωi,t ) [u(Ωi,τ ,c,d)]
}
≥ Est |ε p
[
UAut(Ωi,t)
]
.
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and Perri (2011), solving for efficient allocations reduces to a standard dynamic pro-
gramming problem. In order to use recursive techniques, however, allocations under a
risk-sharing arrangement have to be restricted to stationary allocations. An allocation is
stationary if Φt = Φ for all t. Extending Krueger and Perri (2011), which considered an
endowment economy, the solution can be found by solving a dynamic contract between a
household and an infinitely-lived, risk-neutral agent as described in the next subsection.
2.2.4 The agent’s Problem
The constrained efficient allocation of risk-sharing arrangement is found by solving a
dynamic contract between a household and an infinitely-lived, risk-neutral agent who is
responsible for allocating resources to a given household. It is assumed that the agent has
an access to an outside financial market where he or she can borrow or save at a risk-free
interest rate R. A household is promised a certain level of lifetime utility in the contract.
The agent determines how much of the promised lifetime utility should be delivered as a
form of current consumption and how much should be postponed into the next period as
a utility promise. In this subsection, I set up the agent’s problem in a recursive form.
In the contract a household is promised a certain level of lifetime utility, ωt , which
will be called the “promised utility” throughout the remainder of the paper. The objective
of the agent is to find an allocation that minimizes the discounted sum of the cost of
delivering ωt . The agent chooses the current period utility, h, and the state-contingent
promise to be made in the next period, ωt+1(Ωt+1), along with a child’s activity choice dt
when it is relevant. Define C(·) to be the inverse utility function that gives the amount of
consumption necessary to deliver ht .
The agent’s problem for households whose child is above age 18 is equivalent to
the standard consumption risk-sharing problem which was studied in Krueger and Perri
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(2011). For these households the agent’s problem is given by:
TV (ωt ,Ωt) = min
ht ,{ωt+1(Ωt+1)}∀st+1
{
C(ht)+
1
R
EΩt+1|Ωt [V (ωt+1(Ωt+1),Ωt+1)]
}
, (3)
subject to
ωt = ht +δEΩt+1|Ωt [ωt+1(Ωt+1)] , (4)
ωt+1(Ωt+1)≥UAut(Ωt+1)∀Ωt+1. (5)
When a child is of age a and the child’s activity choices are involved:8
Va(ωt ,Ωt) = min
dt
{
Va(ωt ,Ωt |dhomet = 1),Va(ωt ,Ωt |dschoolt = 1),Va(ωt ,Ωt |dworkt = 1)
}
where
Va(ωt ,Ωt |dt) = min
h,{ωt+1(Ωt+1)}∀st+1
 C(ht ,dt)−wtd
work
t
+ 1REΩt+1|Ωt ,dt [V a+1(ωt+1(Ωt+1),Ωt+1)]
 ,
subject to
ωt = ht +δEΩt+1|Ωt ,dt [ωt+1(Ωt+1)] ∀Ωt+1
ωt+1(Ωt+1)≥ EΩt+1|Ωt ,dt
[
UAutt+1(Ωt+1)
]
∀Ωt+1.
The interest rate R is endogenously determined at the level where the agent neither bor-
8The agent’s problem presented in this subsection is simplified. For example, I did not distinguish the
problems in a fall period and a spring period to simplify the presentation. The main difference between the
fall and the spring problems are, when a child is present, that the child does not get older nor the school
grade is updated at the end of the fall. These events only occur at the end of the spring. Other than these,
the structure of the problems are similar in the fall and the spring.
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rows nor saves, and thus, (RC) holds at equality.
The extension of Krueger and Perri (2011) to this setting is not trivial. It is commonly
known that introducing an investment choice to a limited-commitment model makes the
constraint set non-convex. This is because the investment choice affects the outside option
value (under the assumption that returns from investment are still accrued under autarky),
and the convex combinations of the choices of promised utility and the level of investment
jointly may not be contained in the constraint set. The agent’s problem considered here,
however, solves the minimization problem given a discrete activity choice. Thus, given an
activity choice, such a non-convexity issue does not arise, and the minimization problem
with respect to the future promised utilities is well-defined.
Major challenges in computation arise due to the presence in the problem of both
discrete child activity choices and continuous choice variables {ωt+1(Ωt+1)}Ωt+1 . The
presence of the dynamic discrete choices makes value functions nondifferentiable and
nonconvex with respect to promised utility ωt in the neighborhood where the optimal
child activity choice changes from one to another. As the non-differentiable and non-
convex value functions in period t + 1 enter the optimization problem in period t, the
first order condition is not well defined. Unlike in a standard dynamic discrete choice
model where introducing many shocks convexifies the objective function, there is one
continuous choice variable that needs to be solved for each possible realization of shocks.
Grid searches are robust to the nonconvexity of the objective function; however, the
trade-off between the accuracy of the solution and the computation speed is large. The ac-
curacy of the solution is important to obtain a value for R that satisfies the village resource
constraint. In numerical simulations, a coarse grid of ωt+1 leads to failure to finding such
a value for R. With a grid of ωt+1 that is refined enough to find an equilibrium R, the com-
putation takes an infeasible amount of time. Because of the non-differentiability of the
objective function, efficient algorithms that are based on the first order condition cannot
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be applied.
Fortunately, Clausen and Strub (2013) provide an envelope theorem that is applicable
in this setting. According to their envelope theorem, regardless of the presence of non-
differentiable parts in an objective function, optimal solutions are always found in dif-
ferentiable parts of the objective function. Based on that envelope theorem, Fella (2013)
proposes an algorithm that combines an endogenous grid method, which is based on the
first order condition, and a grid search. By adopting this algorithm, I achieve both ac-
curacy and speed. A detailed explanation of the computational procedure is provided in
Appendix B.
3 Data
In 1997 the Mexican government launched a large-scale cash transfer program to promote
school attendance of children in poor rural areas in the country. As of 1998, a total of
35,688 villages in 28 states that had a high “marginalization index” were selected for
participation. Among households in each village, the program further identified the poor
households that became beneficiaries of the program (For more details, see Skoufias,
Davis, and Behrman, 1999). Beneficiary households whose children were enrolled in
grades 3 to 9 were eligible for educational grants conditional on the attendance of their
children at school for more than 85 percent of the applicable school days. The educational
grant schedule is provided in Table 1.9
9The program also provided cash transfer and nutritional supplements for infants and small children that
were not contingent on schooling, though the educational grant comprised more than 75 percent of the total
amount of the grant (Todd and Wolpin, 2006).
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Table 1: PROGRESA monthly education grant schedule in 1998
Monthly grant in pesos
School level Grade Male Female
Primary 3 70 70
4 80 80
5 105 105
6 135 135
Secondary 1 200 210
2 210 235
3 220 255
Source: Schultz (2004)
For the evaluation of the program, village- and household-level survey data was col-
lected in 506 randomly selected villages. Moreover, a randomization of treatment villages
and control villages was performed. The beneficiary households in 324 treatment villages
started receiving the program transfers in 1998 and those in 182 control villages did at the
end of 1999. The survey data was collected in both treatment and control villages before
and after the implementation of the program. The baseline surveys were done in October
1997 and March 1998, and the three follow-up surveys were conducted in October 1998,
May 1999, and November 1999, all before the control villages started receiving the pro-
gram transfers. Every household in selected villages was surveyed; in the baseline surveys
there were 24,077 households (9,221 in the control villages and 14,856 in the treatment
villages). The household-level survey contains information about household members,
including their age, most recently completed school grade, school attendance, employ-
ment, and information about individual members’ wage income, household income from
other sources, household food consumption, and household expenditure on both food and
non-food items.
The school enrollment status of children at the time of the survey was collected; if
a child was attending school at the time of the survey, I assume that he or she attended
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Figure 1: School enrollment rate and completed school grade by age
Source: PROGRESA data October 1998, May 1999, and November 1999. The sample
is restricted to all control villages.
Table 2: Proportion of children making transitions into or out of school
All Age≤12 Age>12
No transition into or out of school 0.72 0.80 0.43
One transition 0.18 0.12 0.38
Two transitions or more 0.11 0.08 0.20
Number of observations 16,981
Source: De Janvry et al. (2006). PROGRESA data over 7 semesters from November
1997-November 2000.
school for the entire semester. School enrollment is almost universal before age 12 and
starts to drop sharply around age 14. In control villages, the school enrollment rate be-
tween ages 16 and 18 during the data periods is around 30 percent, and the completed
grade of children at age 18 is less than 7th grade (Figure 1). School attendance is not only
low but also irregular. As shown in Table 2, 20 percent of children of the age of 12 and
above make at least two transitions into and out of school. Table 3 shows that the most
frequently cited reason for absence is “not enough money”, which suggests that financial
constraint is important determinant of observed schooling outcomes in these villages.
Child labor is prevalent and a significant source of income in these villages. Child
labor becomes increasingly common after the age of 12, and the fraction working for a
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Table 3: Reasons for not attending school
Reason for not attending school % who reported this reason
Not enough money to attend school 55
Did not like school 17
School is far away 6
Help was needed at home or work 6
Others 14
No response 3
Number of observations 8,527
Source: PROGRESA data October 1998, May 1999, and November 1999. The sample
is restricted to all control villages and children between the ages of 12 and 18.
wage reaches 35 percent by the age of 18 (Figure 2(a)). The contribution of children
(including zero wage) to household income increases with the age of the oldest child,
reaching 30 percent of total household income at the age of 18 (Figure 2(b)). In families
where a child works for a wage, the proportion of their contribution to household income
is 40 percent (Figure 2(c)).
In the data, only 1.2 percent of children between the ages of 12 and 18 were both
attending school and working. The assumption that the activity choices are mutually
exclusive does not seem to be very restrictive.10 Also, only 0.4 percent of the children
below age 12 worked.
Table 4 shows the prevalence of shocks faced by households in PROGRESA villages.
In the data, 12 percent of households reported that their head had fallen ill at least once
within a given month, and almost 70 percent of them had to withdraw from work for one
or more days due to the illness. Also, 16 percent of households reported that their head
was unemployed at a certain point in a given month. Natural disasters such as droughts are
also common. 40 percent of households reported that they had experienced a drought at
10When children are both attending school and working, I treat them as attending school regardless of
whether they also worked.
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Figure 2: Child labor in PROGRESA villages
Source: PROGRESA data October 1998, May 1999, and November 1999.
The sample is restricted to all control villages.
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Table 4: Percentage of households having experienced various shocks
Household head ill at least once in a given month 12%
Withdrawn from work due to illness at least a day 68%
Withdrawn from work due to illness at least for a week 36%
Household head unemployed at least once in a given month 16%
Natural disaster in 6 months 43%
Droughts in 6 months 31%
Average percentage of households in a village reporting the droughts 40%
Number of observations 80,916
Source: PROGRESA data October 1998, May 1999, and November 1999. All villages.
least once within the past 6 months. Droughts are regarded as a community-wide shock;
however, not all households in a village reported the experience of the same shock. In
a given village, on average, 4 out of 10 households report that they had experienced a
drought whereas 6 out of 10 households reported that they had not experienced any during
the same periods. Reported damage also varied across households in each given village,
suggesting that there is a room for risk sharing among households in a village even in
times of natural disaster.
There is evidence that households exchange informal transfers and rely on informal
sources to borrow money in PROGRESA villages. As shown in Table 5, 10 percent of
households reported some form of support received from or given to other households
within a single month.11 The average amount of support was 475 pesos, which is a sub-
stantial amount considering that the average monthly household expenditure is 1,071 pe-
sos in these villages. Also, more than 60 percent of reported credit (in frequency, not
in the amount of money) was from informal sources such as relatives, neighbors, and
1110 percent is arguably not large enough to support a model assumption that every household participates
in risk sharing, even after considering that the survey asks about supports made during a particular month.
It is possible that the phrase in the survey question, “support”, may have led to under-representation of
the actual extent of interhousehold transfers. Cox and Fafchamps (2007) document that in rural China, the
response of households for receiving “money gifts” was five times larger than when a survey question asked
about “transfers”, which carried a connotation of “financial support”.
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Table 5: Informal financial activities in PROGRESA villages
Giving or receiving support from other households
Percentage of households reported the activity 10%
Average amount of the support 475 pesos
Borrowing or credit
Percentage of households reported the activity 2%
Percentage of credit from relatives/neighbors/friends 62%
Number of observations 26,972
Source: PROGRESA data October 1998, May 1999, and November 1999. Average amount
of the support is reported in nominal Mexican peso.
friends.
In addition, the data on income from other sources such as sales of a household mem-
ber’s service, crop production, livestock sales, government program transfers other than
PROGRESA (such as pensions), rent, and any interest from savings were also available.
Household income variable was constructed as the sum of all members’ wage income and
income from other sources. Parental income is obtained by subtracting the sum of the
wage income of children from household income.
The survey also contains detailed information about the quantity and the value of
household food consumption, non-food expenditures, and income from various sources.
The consumption variables are available in the October 1998, May 1999, and November
1999 waves, but not in the baseline surveys; thus, in my analysis, only the later three
waves are used. I convert the household income and consumption to the adult-equivalent
per-capita level adjusted by the economies of scale. The adult equivalent weights are
based on the calculation of Di Maro (2004).12 See Appendix C for details about how the
income and consumption and variables are constructed.
12Di Maro (2004) assigns 1 on adult members above age 18 and 0.73 on members of age 18 and below.
Then I further adjust the adult equivalent size of the households for the economies of scale by taking a square
root. For example, in a household that has two adults who are age 40 and three children who are age 10,
the adult equivalent size of the household adjusted for the economics of scale is
√
2×1+3×0.7 = 2.025.
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In the estimation, I use the 11 largest control villages, which have more than 100
households each. I restrict the sample to large control villages for two reasons. First, I
use large villages because the model assumes a continuum of households, which is better
approximated by large villages. Second, I use control villages because the model solution
algorithm requires stationarity of the economy. In treatment villages, the village economy
may be on a transition path to a different steady state than in the control villages, due to
the introduction of the cash transfer program. There are 1,433 households in the selected
sample. Also, when I map the model to the data, I only track the information about
the oldest child of each household. For example, the model outcomes such as school
attendance and the accepted wage of a 12-year-old-child are compared to the observed
outcomes of the households whose oldest child is 12 years of age in the data.13 Table 6
provides the summary statistics of the selected sample. The school enrollment rate and
the fraction of children working for a wage by age is based on the oldest child. When
constructing moments in the estimation, income is deflated so that the aggregate income
level is the same as the aggregate consumption level.14
13In PROGRESA villages, the birth order does not seem to affect the school attendance decision much
as the coefficient of the birth order variable in the probit regression of the school enrollment was close
to zero and not significant at conventional level. The sample used in the analysis was comprised of all
children between ages 6 and 18 in both the treatment and control villages (about 48,000 children in total).
Other controls were age, gender, parental education, completed grade, and village-fixed effect. The most
important determinant was the age of a child.
14The aggregate consumption-to-income ratios in each village are 0.58, 0.68, 0.96, 0.56, 0.66, 0.67, 0.77,
0.73, 1.25, 0.95, and 0.96. Except for one village, the surplus is on the income side, and in the majority of
villages, the surplus is larger than 20 percent. What accounts for the surplus is not clear. Ligon, Thomas,
and Worrall (2002) had the same issue in Indian ICRISAT villages data, and they suggest mismeasurement
or village aggregate saving as possible sources of such discrepancies. In the estimation, I deflate income in
each village so that the village aggregate consumption and income are the same.
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Table 6: Summary statistics
mean (s.d.)
Completed school grade
mothers 3.18 (2.69)
fathers 3.81 (2.56)
children at age 18 7.42 (2.37)
School enrollment rate
6≤age≤11 .98 (.13)
12≤age≤15 .77 (.42)
16≤age≤18 .36 (.48)
Fraction of children working for wage
12≤age≤15 .06 (.24)
16≤age≤18 .31 (.46)
Children’s wage income 1,179.24 (1,232.13)
Household income 2,478.75 (2,978.39)
Number of observations 4,152
Source: PROGRESA data October 1998, May 1999, and November 1999. The
sample is restricted to the eleven largest control villages. Children’s wage in-
come and household income variables are in per adult-equivalent level and in
1998 Mexican pesos.
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4 Estimation
I use the method of simulated moments to estimate the model parameters.15 This estima-
tion method finds a set of parameter values that minimizes the weighted distance between
the aggregate moments constructed with the data and that of the simulated outcomes of the
model. The weights are given by the inverse of estimated variances of the data moments
following Lee and Wolpin (2010).
The simulated moments are generated from the computed stationary distribution for
a given set of parameters. I use the observed completed school grade of mothers and
the estimated type-probability process to determine the type of parents of each house-
hold. Given the parental type, the age and completed school grade of each child is drawn
from the stationary distribution. I assume that the state of the economy when the par-
ents’ schooling investment was made is different from the current steady state and that
the parental schooling distribution and the parental type distribution are exogenous to
the model. I also assume that the new households entering the economy have the same
schooling distribution as the mothers in the sample. Thus, the parental schooling distribu-
tion and the resulting parental type distribution are constant over time. Given the parental
15Parameters in the model are identified by the combination of functional forms, distributional assump-
tions, and exclusion restrictions. µ p in the parental and household income processes for high-income type
are normalized to be zero. Although the parameters in the parental and household income processes are
identified outside the model, estimating the income process jointly with other model parameters makes the
estimation more efficient. This is because the parameters in the income process determine the return from
schooling, and thus they affect other parameters that govern child activity choices. I fix the subjective dis-
count factor δ at a conventional level of 0.95 because with a constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility
function it is not obvious how to separately identify the risk aversion and time discounting parameters.
Grade-completion probability for grades 7-12, πgr(dschoolt ,d
school
t−1 ) are not estimated but imputed based on
the fraction of children completing one school grade given their observed enrollment status. The computed
grade-completion probability for grades 7-12 is given by πgr(1,1) = 0.8, πgr(1,0) = πgr(0,1) = 0.25, and
πgr(0,0) = 0.1. Grade-completion probability for children below age 12 (or between grades 1-6), π12gr (X ,k),
for each (X ,k) are estimated where X is a school grade in which a child is enrolled and k is a parental type.
Although πgr(dschoolt ,d
school
t−1 ) is independent of parental type, the proportion of children who complete a
school grade each year can differ across different parental types because dschoolt is a choice and is affected
by parental type. Demographic transition probabilities πb, πm, and πd are also imputed based on the ob-
served proportion of households which make a given demographic transition each year. The imputed values
are: πb = 0.17, πm = 0.036, and πd = 0.12.
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type, the age and the completed school grade of a child, and a set of shocks, an efficient
allocation is computed by solving the agent’s problem. Then, the simulated moments are
constructed as an average over the outcomes which are associated with many different
sets of shocks.
Target moments used in the estimation are listed below. A “grown-up child” refers to
a child whose age is above 18.
1. Income process
(a) Mean parental income by village, excluding households with a grown-up child
(b) Mean household income by village (households with a grown-up child only)
(c) Standard deviation of mean-differenced log parental income by village, ex-
cluding households with a grown-up child
(d) Standard deviation of mean-differenced log household income by village (house-
holds with a grown-up child only)
(e) Mean parental income by the completed grade of mothers, excluding house-
holds with a grown-up child
(f) Mean parental income by the completed grade of mothers (households with a
grown-up child only)
(g) Mean household income by the completed grade of children (households with
a grown-up child only)
(h) Standard deviation of log parental income by the completed grade of mothers,
excluding households with a grown-up child only
(i) Standard deviation of log household income by the completed grade of chil-
dren (households with a grown-up child only).
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2. Child wage process
(a) Mean accepted wage by age, from ages 12 to 18
(b) Mean accepted wage by parental income quartile
(c) Mean accepted wage by the completed grade of mothers.
3. Child activity choice
(a) Proportion of children attending school and working by age, from age 12 to
age 18
(b) Proportion of children staying home, attending school, and working between
ages 12 and 16 by parental income quartile
(c) Proportion of children attending in each of the 5th, 6th, 8th, and 9th grades
(d) Proportion of children attending school in the spring but who were not en-
rolled in the previous fall
(e) Proportion of children attending school in the fall but were not enrolled in the
previous spring
(f) Proportion of children attending school by years behind the standard grade
level at each age
(g) Mean parental income of households with a child attending middle school
(grades 7 to 9)
(h) Mean parental income of households whose child is eligible to attend middle
school but stays home
(i) Mean parental income of households whose child attends high school (grades
10 to 12)
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(j) Mean parental income of households whose child is eligible for high school
but stays home.
4. School grade completion16
(a) Proportion of 12-year-old children who completed no grade, 1st grade, 2nd
grade, ..., 6th grade by the completed school grade of their mothers.
5. Consumption
(a) Mean consumption by the completed grade of mothers
(b) Mean consumption by the completed grade of child (households with a grown-
up child only)
(c) Mean consumption by parental income quartile
(d) Correlation of mean-differenced household income and consumption over time.
4.1 Parameter estimates
The estimated parameters are shown in Table 7-Table 10.17 I discuss the parameter esti-
mates of particular interests in the following subsections.
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Table 7: Parameter estimates: income process
Village fixed effect Income shock variance
Village
Parental Household Parental Household
income (β pv ) income (β hv ) income (σ
p
v ) income (σhv )
1 8.12 (.0063) 8.84 (.0210) .88 (.0002) .58 (.0069)
2 7.49 (.0063) 8.79 (.0370) .87 (.0002) .71 (.0358)
3 7.52 (.0061) 8.08 (.0331) .90 (.0002) .84 (.0310)
4 8.23 (.0063) 8.87 (.0325) .57 (.0001) .69 (.0234)
5 7.87 (.0062) 8.74 (.0274) .55 (.0002) .62 (.0206)
6 8.11 (.0063) 8.40 (.0390) .87 (.0002) .86 (.0368)
7 7.71 (.0081) 8.27 (.0456) .70 (.0002) .92 (.0337)
8 7.61 (.0066) 8.05 (.0288) .79 (.0001) .78 (.0251)
9 7.72 (.0049) 8.50 (.0391) .71 (.0002) .75 (.0436)
10 7.57 (.0054) 8.14 (.0308) .89 (.0002) 1.01 (.0291)
11 7.80 (.0057) 8.62 (.0113) .55 (.0002) .84 (.0000)
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses.
4.1.1 Income, wage, and type process parameters
Table 7-Table 9 provide parameter estimates for parental income, child wage, household
income, and type process parameters. As shown in Table 7, the mean and the variance of
parental and household income vary significantly across villages. In all villages, house-
hold income with a grown-up child is larger than that of other households. Table 8 pro-
vides parameter estimates for the child wage process. Mean wage offers for children
substantially increase with the child’s age, implying a higher opportunity cost of attend-
ing school for older children. Table 9 provides type process parameter estimates. The
16The current estimation on which the results reported in the paper are based does not incorporate the
moments related to school grade completion. School grade completion probabilities π12gr (X , ptype) for
X = 0, ...,6 and ptype = low,high are calibrated. The results of the full estimation are forthcoming. The
calibrated values are given by the following. The numbers may not sum up to 1 because they are rounded:
ptype\X 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
low 0.03 0.01 0.05 0.12 0.27 0.28 0.13
high 0.08 0.01 0.01 0.05 0.08 0.31 0.47
17Some of the standard errors are missing. The estimation results will be updated soon.
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Table 8: Parameter estimates: child wage process
Age-specific constant (β wa )
age 12, 13 2.00 (.0793)
14 4.00 (.2227)
15 4.00 (.2169)
16 4.20 (.2226)
17 5.00 (.3514)
18 5.03 (.1132)
Wage shock variance (σ2w) 1.62 (.0062)
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses.
estimated type component in income process, µ p, is -0.9 for the low-income type, trans-
lating to a mean income that is 41 percent of high-income-type ones.18 This is compatible
with the observed difference in mean incomes of poor (CCT beneficiaries) and non-poor
households in the data.19 The estimated parameters in the type probability process predict
that the probability of being a high-income-type child when no grade is completed is 0.25
and that completing the 6th, 9th, and 12th grades increases this probability to 0.48, 0.56,
and 0.66 respectively. Combined with the estimated µ p, the estimated type probability
process predicts that, compared to those who did not finish any school grade, the expected
mean household income is 24, 33, and 43 percent higher when a child completes 6th, 9th,
and 12th grades.20 The type components of parents and children enter multiplicatively in
18This calculation is done by:
Realized income of low-income type
Realized income of high-income type
=
eβv+µ
p+ε p
eβv+ε p
== exp(−0.9)' 0.41
19In the sample used in the estimation, the observed mean of per adult-equivalent household income of
the beneficiary households for 6 months is 1835.68 pesos and that of the non-beneficiary households is
3022.26 pesos.
20The relative size of income is obtained by the following calculations:
(A) Mean income of those who did not complete any school grade = 0.75eβv−µ
p+0.5σ pv +0.25eβv+0.5σ
p
v
(B) Mean income of those who completed 6th grade =0.52eβv−µ
p+0.5σ pv +0.48eβv+0.5σ
p
v
The relative size of mean income when completing 6th grade=(B-A)/A=0.24. Similar calculations were
done for 9th and 12th grades.
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Table 9: Parameter estimates: type process
Unobserved type component in income process
Constant term for low-income type (µ) -.90 (.0058)
Type probability process (probability of being high-income type)
When completed grade is observed
Constant (γ0) -1.00 (.0021)
Coefficient of completed school grade
For grade between 1 and 6 (γX ,primary) .10 (.0143)
For grade above 6 (γX ,secondary) .08 (.0183)
Coefficient of completing primary school (γ6) .30 (.0595)
Coefficient of completing middle school (γ9) .12 (.0132)
Coefficient of completing high school (γ12) .17 (.0123)
When completed grade is not observed
Constant (γX0) .80 (.0130)
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses.
the household income process, and households with high-income type parents have larger
return from schooling.
4.1.2 Preference Parameters
Preference parameter estimates are provided in Table 10. The estimated risk aversion
coefficient is 0.63. This is within the range of the values which were found in other
studies that structurally estimate limited-commitment risk-sharing models using village-
level data in developing countries.21
The estimated parameters for utilities from completing primary, middle, and high
school are 0.30, 0.50, and 0.75 respectively. To provide an idea of how large these num-
21Other papers that structurally estimate a limited-commitment risk-sharing model by using data from
rural villages have found larger risk aversion coefficient estimates. For example, the estimated risk aversion
coefficients of the CRRA utility function in Ligon, Thomas, and Worrall (2002) are between 0.84 and 1.61.
These values are associated with the estimated values of time discount factors which range between 0.7 and
0.95, where a large discount factor is associated with a low risk aversion coefficient. In Morten (2013) risk
aversion coefficient is fixed at 1.6 and the estimated values of discount factor lie between 0.43 and 0.66.
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Table 10: Parameter estimates: preference
Risk aversion coefficient (η) .63 (.0015)
Utility cost of attending to school
At least one years behind of standard grade level
-.50 (.0016)
at certain age (κgap1)
6+ years behind of standard grade level (κgap6) -1.20 (.0016)
9+ years behind of standard grade level (κgap9) -1.20 (.0049)
Attending school after not attending school in the
previous period
Spring semester (κprev,spring) -1.00 (.2561)
Fall semester (κprev, f all) -.20 (.0408)
Utility from staying home (κhome,a)
For children age 14 4.50 (.1669)
For children age between 15 and 16 4.80 (.9891)
For children age between 17 and 18 5.00 (.1974)
Idiosyncratic leisure preference shock variance (σξ ) 3.50 (.5514)
Utility cost of working for a wage (κwork,a)
For children age between 12 and 14 -1.40 (944.29)
For children age between 15 and 16 -1.40 (.2398)
Utility from completed schooling
Completing primary school (κ6) .36 (.2804)
Completing middle school (κ9) .56 (.2462)
Completing high school (κ12) .76 (.3743)
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses.
bers are I convert them into consumption-equivalent terms given a reference consumption
level of 2,634.46 pesos, which is the estimated mean consumption level in the economy.
The utilities from completing schools are translated into 183.42, 210.57, and 259.24 addi-
tional pesos of consumption respectively, compared to the households of which the child
did not finish primary school.22
The estimated parameters for the leisure value of a child are translated into 100.34
22The consumption-equivalent values were obtained by the following way. Suppose that a household has
household consumption of 2,634.46 pesos (which is the average amount of consumption in the villages) and
that the household has a child who completed 6th grade. Let x denote the estimated utility from completing
35
pesos for ages 12 and 13; 272.75 pesos for age 14, 15, and 16; and 449.68 pesos for ages
17 and 18. Because consumption and leisure values are perfectly substitutable under the
current specification, the utility from leisure is relatively more important for households
which have a smaller amount of household consumption.
The utility cost of attending school can be converted into consumption-equivalent
terms in a similar way as it was done for the utilities from completed schooling. The
utility loss from attending school when a child is behind by at least one school year, 6 or
more years, or 9 or more years is translated into a decrease in household consumption by
190.28, 243.70, and 298.79 pesos respectively. The cost of returning to school when a
child did not attend school in the previous semester is translated into 336.12 pesos.
4.2 Model fit
Tables 11-16 provide information on how well the estimated model fits the data.
Table 11 compares the actual and predicted mean and log-variance of parental and
household incomes. The model fits the mean and variance of income values at the village
level very well.
Table 13 compares the actual and predicted mean and log-variance of parental income.
The model fits the variance very closely, but the mean incomes for lower education groups
(those with no schooling or only some primary schooling) are overpredicted.
Table 14 shows that the model fits the completed grade by age, the proportion of
children attending school and working for a wage, and the mean accepted wage by age
very well. In other age groups, the model predictions are very close to the actual levels
6th grade. Then, the period utility of the household is 2634.46
1−η−1
1−η + x. I solve for c such that:
(2634.46+ c)1−η −1
1−η
=
2634.461−η −1
1−η
+ x
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found in the data. Although the mean wage offer increases with age, because of the
selection, the accepted mean wage level does not increase with age after age 13.
The predicted correlation between household income and consumption is 0.103 and is
close to the actual level of 0.084 as shown in Table 16. This suggests that the allocations
in these villages are close to allocations under complete risk sharing.
Table 11: Actual and Predicted Mean Parental and Household Income
Parental income Household income
without a grown-up child with a grown-up child
Village Actual Predicted Actual Predicted
1 3124.25 3126.74 3837.55 3829.02
2 1586.64 1527.31 4074.70 4083.43
3 1638.21 1604.79 2041.31 2024.47
4 2658.78 2628.94 4230.92 4269.64
5 1855.24 1833.06 3470.49 3493.49
6 3071.18 3035.35 2992.50 3040.96
7 1825.64 1822.71 2820.83 2836.88
8 1760.51 1757.09 1901.35 1960.59
9 1701.70 1696.31 2849.33 2822.12
10 1707.54 1714.15 2493.06 2507.88
11 1656.71 1643.14 3509.41 3526.11
37
Table 12: Actual and predicted log parental and household income variance
Parental income Household income
without a grown-up child with a grown-up child
Village Actual Predicted Actual Predicted
1 0.72 0.72 0.45 0.46
2 0.70 0.69 0.55 0.54
3 0.74 0.74 0.65 0.65
4 0.46 0.46 0.53 0.55
5 0.44 0.44 0.48 0.49
6 0.71 0.71 0.67 0.67
7 0.57 0.57 0.71 0.72
8 0.63 0.63 0.60 0.61
9 0.59 0.59 0.58 0.57
10 0.72 0.72 0.79 0.76
11 0.42 0.42 0.65 0.67
Table 13: Actual and predicted parental income by mother’s completed school grade
Mean s.d.
Actual Predicted Actual Predicted
no school 1812.39 2063.89 0.8757 0.8843
some primary 1946.08 2071.67 1.0164 0.8829
primary and beyond 2233.32 2287.21 0.8559 0.8829
not reported 2213.08 2156.61 1.0666 0.8934
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Table 14: Actual and predicted moments by age
Completed school grade Fraction attending school
Age Actual Predicted Actual Predicted
12 4.49 4.52 0.91 0.91
13 5.47 5.22 0.91 0.91
14 5.99 5.92 0.70 0.73
15 7.06 6.48 0.53 0.63
16 7.11 6.98 0.46 0.55
17 6.87 7.44 0.29 0.35
18 7.42 7.75 0.13 0.24
Fraction working Mean accepted wage
Age Actual Predicted Actual Predicted
12 0.01 0.01 359.12 406.43
13 0.02 0.01 522.83 437.66
14 0.12 0.10 1503.66 1196.84
15 0.11 0.11 923.64 1159.54
16 0.17 0.12 1322.43 1320.00
17 0.32 0.32 1528.20 1448.41
18 0.44 0.49 1204.83 1042.14
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Table 15: Actual and predicted consumption, proportion attending school and staying
home, mean wage by income quartile
Mean Consumption Fraction in school
Income quartile Actual Predicted Actual Predicted
25% 1982.09 1852.64 0.64 0.61
50% 2142.22 2231.33 0.65 0.70
75% 2259.76 2526.20 0.73 0.73
100% 2987.52 2789.29 0.78 0.78
Mean Wage Fraction staying home
Income quartile Actual Predicted Actual Predicted
25% 836.45 1004.40 0.25 0.23
50% 869.86 1171.71 0.23 0.17
75% 1402.24 1226.61 0.20 0.15
100% 2150.56 1328.46 0.15 0.12
Table 16: Actual and predicted correlation between household income and consumption
Actual Predicted
0.084 0.103
5 Counterfactual Analysis
In this section I discuss the results of the two counterfactual experiments. Throughout
this section, the baseline model refers to the estimated limited-commitment risk-sharing
model without any policy intervention. In the first experiment, I simulate the consump-
tion and child activity choices under autarky given the estimated set of parameter values,
and compare the outcomes to those predicted by the baseline model. The purpose of this
exercise is to quantify the effectiveness of informal risk sharing in smoothing consump-
tion and schooling. In the second experiment, I introduce CCT to both the baseline model
and the autarky model. Todd and Wolpin (2006) make a prediction about the long-term
effect of PROGRESA and alternative designs of the program subsidy under the autarky
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Figure 3: Estimated distribution over discretized income states
assumption. Using the model developed in this paper, I can compare the predicted CCT
outcomes when risk sharing interacts with CCT and when households make decisions un-
der autarky without risk sharing. All simulated outcomes are drawn from the stationary
distribution. The distribution of the completed grade of parents is not affected by CCT or
the presence of risk sharing.
5.1 Risk Sharing and Autarky
Figure 4 and Table 17 provide the outcomes from the first experiment. Figure 4 shows (a)
the fraction of children attending school, (b) fraction working for a wage between ages
of 12 and 18, (c) average household consumption, and (d) the mean accepted wage by
children between ages of 12 and 18 of households which are in different parental income
states at a cross-section. The estimated cross-sectional distribution of discretized income
states is given by Figure 3. On the x-axis of all four panels, the size of the relative devi-
ations from the mean log-income which corresponds to each income state is given. The
dark solid lines are outcomes obtained under risk sharing, the dark dotted lines are out-
comes under autarky, and the light solid lines are from the data. If risk sharing is complete,
the outcomes should not vary across different income states. As it is shown in Figure 4,
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in the data, the observed outcomes do not vary across different parental income states
which are associated with negative or small positive shocks suggesting that households
are well insured against these shocks. The outcomes under risk sharing capture this pat-
tern very well. However, in the data, the observed schooling and consumption outcomes
are positively associated with parental income states for large positive income shocks.
The outcomes under risk sharing fail to capture this pattern and predict that households
are well insured against large positive shocks as well. Under autarky, all outcomes vary
substantially with parental income states.
Table 17 shows that the overall fraction of children attending school is lower under
autarky than under risk sharing. Under autarky, there are more children whose school
attendance was interrupted at least once in the past due to a negative parental income
shock. Once school attendance is interrupted, the cost of attending school becomes higher.
The effect of this transitory income shock accumulates over time, which leads to a lower
school attendance rate under autarky. Overall, under autarky, the fraction attending school
is 11 percentage points lower than that with risk sharing and the completed school grade
by age 19 is higher by almost a half year, as shown in Table 17.
Although the income earned by children younger than age 19 is smaller as fewer chil-
dren work for wages under risk sharing (Table 17), a higher completed school grade leads
to a larger fraction of high-income type children, which increases the size of the village
Table 17: Outcomes under risk sharing and autarky
Risk sharing Autarky
Completed grade at age 19 8.42 7.95
Fraction attending school, 12≤age≤18 0.64 0.52
Fraction working, 12≤age≤18 0.18 0.21
Children’s (accepted) wage (in peso) 1,255.80 1,141.65
Household consumption (in peso) 2,643.06 2,627.05
Welfare in consumption equivalence (in peso) 2,034.84 1,862.54
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Figure 4: Outcomes under risk sharing and autarky by cross-sectional income states
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resource available for consumption. I also compare the lifetime welfare of new house-
holds under the two regimes. Welfare is converted into consumption-equivalent terms,
assuming that households live for 60 years (or 120 model periods) and that the amount of
consumption in every period is constant.23 The consumption-equivalent lifetime utility
under risk sharing is 2,034.84 pesos, which is 172.30 pesos or 9 percent larger than un-
der autarky. The difference comes from a combination of a higher level of consumption
and a larger utility from completed schooling, as well as from less volatility in household
consumption.
5.2 Effects of Conditional Cash Transfer
In the second counterfactual experiment I introduce a conditional cash transfer (CCT)
program, which is similar to the design of PROGRESA to both the baseline risk-sharing
model and the autarky model. Actual PROGRESA beneficiaries were selected based on
multidimensional household characteristics, such as the main materials of walls and floors
of household dwellings and ownership of durable goods and assets. Because my model
does not have these variables I cannot apply the same criteria. Instead, I choose the low-
income type households in the model as beneficiaries. To make the exercise compatible
with the actual policy, I take the actual PROGRESA educational grant schedule and con-
vert it into adult-equivalent terms and adjust for the economies of scale as was done for
23Under these assumptions, and with the discount factor of 0.95 and risk aversion coefficient of 0.63, the
lifetime utility of a new household is given by:
(lifetime utility) =
120
∑
t=1
δ
t−1
(
C1−η −1
1−η
)
=
1−δ 120
1−δ
(
C1−η −1
1−η
)
= 19.08
(
C0.37−1
0.37
)
,
and the consumption-equivalent term, C, of the given lifetime utility is calculated by the following formula:
C =
[
(lifetime utility)0.37
19.08
+1
] 1
0.37
.
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Table 18: Educational grant schedule used in counterfactual experiment, 12≤age≤18
School level Grade Monthly grant in pesos
Primary 3 145.83
4 168.48
5 211.22
6 269.15
Secondary 1 410.69
2 403.86
3 457.14
Table 19: Educational grant schedule used in counterfactual experiment, 6≤age≤11
Age Monthly grant in pesos
6 0
7 0
8 145.83
9 145.81
10 170.14
11 206.50
household income and consumption.24 Because households vary in their size, the ad-
justed amount varies across households. I take the median value of the adjusted amount
of program transfers in each grade level and introduce the amount to the model. Because
I do not track the school grade of children before age 12 in the model, for that age group it
is not feasible to implement the subsidy schedule based on their completed school grade.
Instead, I construct the subsidy schedule based on their age instead of school grade. The
constructed semi-annual educational grant schedule is provided in Tables 18 and 19. Ta-
ble 20-Table 23 provide the results of the CCT experiments.
The effect of the CCT on schooling outcomes under risk sharing is shown in Table
24 To do this, I first assign the program transfers as shown in Table 1 to the sample households. The
amount of the program transfers assigned to each household corresponds to the completed school grade of
the oldest child of that household. Then I rescale the amount of program transfers for each household by an
adult-equivalent household size and adjust for the economies of scale.
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20. The fraction of children attending school between ages 12 and 18 among benefi-
ciary households increases by 0.24, from 0.51 to 0.75, and their completed grade at age
19 increases by 1.17 years, from 7.11 to 8.28. There is little change for non-beneficiary
households. There is no change in the outside option value for the non-beneficiary house-
holds and their demand for risk sharing is not affected by the introduction of the CCT.
Also, the current model assumes that a village is populated by a continuum of house-
holds. Because idiosyncratic risks can be pooled among each type and any difference in
permanent or deterministic components in income are not shared, the high-income type
households are not much affected by changes among the low-income type households.
Note that under this experiment households fully anticipate the presence of subsidy from
the beginning of their lifecycle. Although there is an equilibrium effect, the effect turns
out to be very small on the high-income type (non-beneficiary) households.25
Table 20: The effect of CCT on schooling outcome under risk sharing
No CCT CCT
All Beneficiary All Beneficiary
Fraction attending school 0.55 0.51 0.73 0.75
Completed grade at age 19 7.53 7.11 8.37 8.28
Table 21: The effect of CCT on income, consumption, and welfare outcome under risk
sharing
No CCT CCT
Household consumption 2,634.46 2,661.46
Beneficiary household consumption 1,667.29 1,839.44
Correlation of income and consumption 0.10 0.12
Welfare in consumption equivalence 1,926.66 1,952.93
CCT expenditure - 28.43
Notes: The unit of the reported numbers is Mexican peso.
25Among high-income type households, the fraction attending school slightly increases from 0.6685 to
0.6689 and the completed grade at age 19 increases from 8.5825 to 8.5836. The changes are negligible and
are thus not reported in the tables.
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Table 22: The effect of CCT on schooling outcome under autarky
No CCT CCT
All Beneficiary All Beneficiary
Fraction attending school 0.44 0.39 0.69 0.74
Completed grade at age 19 7.10 6.68 8.22 8.26
Table 21 shows the effect of the CCT on household income, consumption, and wel-
fare. The reported outcomes are at the village-aggregate level which includes both bene-
ficiary and non-beneficiary households. The household consumption level with the CCT
is higher by 27 pesos, and the welfare in consumption equivalence increases by 26.27 pe-
sos. The correlation between household income and consumption increases by 20 percent,
from 0.10 to 0.12. This is because CCT increases the outside option value of beneficiary
households which makes (V P) of these households bind more. The reported CCT expen-
diture is total CCT amount claimed by beneficiary households in all villages divided by
the total measure of households. The CCT expenditure computed in this way is 28.43
pesos, which means that the CCT budget was large enough to give 28.43 pesos to every
household in the village in each period. The return from the CCT is calculated as the
change in the outcome of interests divided by the CCT expenditure. The computed return
is 0.95 for household consumption and 0.92 for welfare.
The effect of the CCT on schooling outcomes under autarky is shown in Table 22.
Because there is no interaction among households, non-beneficiary households are not
affected by the introduction of the CCT. The fraction of children attending school among
beneficiary households increases by 0.35, from 0.39 to 0.74. Their completed grade at
age 19 increases by 1.58 years, from 6.68 to 8.26. Household consumption and welfare
in consumption equivalence increases by 37.10 and 34.36 pesos respectively. The CCT
expenditure is 28.05 pesos. The return from the CCT is computed as in under risk sharing,
and it is 1.32 and 1.22 respectively for household consumption and welfare.
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Table 23: The effect of CCT on income, consumption, and welfare outcome under autarky
No CCT CCT
Household consumption 2,629.79 2,666.89
Beneficiary household consumption 1,802.63 2,025.85
Welfare in consumption equivalence 1,770.81 1,805.17
CCT expenditure - 28.05
Notes: The unit of the reported numbers is Mexican peso.
In comparison to the outcomes under autarky, the effects of the CCT under risk shar-
ing are smaller. Under risk sharing, without the CCT, the fraction of children attending
school among beneficiary households is 12 percentage points higher under risk sharing
than under autarky; however, with the CCT, the difference is only one percentage point.
The returns from the CCT in terms of household consumption and welfare are much
larger under autarky. There are two possible explanations. First, the CCT also serves as
insurance under autarky. Without the CCT, there are more borrowing-constrained house-
holds under autarky than under risk sharing. The CCT not only increases the return from
schooling but also relaxes the borrowing constraints of households which are hit by neg-
ative parental income shocks. However, under risk sharing, the latter effect is negligible
because households already had informal insurance that was close to complete risk shar-
ing. Second, this may be due to the design of the program transfer schedule which gives
cash transfer only up to the 9th grade. Because there are more children who are closer to
or above the 9th grade under risk sharing than under autarky without CCT, there are more
households that would respond to CCT under autarky (“ceiling effect”).
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Table 24: (a) Fraction of children attending school and (b) mean household consumption
under autarky by cross-sectional parental-income states
(a) Fraction attending school
Deviation from the mean log income No CCT CCT Diff
- two s.d. .36 .68 +.32
- one s.d. .41 .69 +.28
zero .44 .70 +.26
+ one s.d. .47 .68 +.21
+ two s.d. .49 .64 +.15
(b) Mean consumption
Deviation from the mean log income No CCT CCT Diff
- two s.d. 623.03 787.74 +165.02
- one s.d. 1002.22 1167.12 +165.39
zero 1827.51 1988.95 +162.32
+ one s.d. 3741.84 3893.40 +152.61
+ two s.d. 7699.53 7833.98 +136.44
Notes: The unit of the reported numbers is Mexican peso.
Table 25: Effect of CCT with completed grade at age 12 fixed at 2nd grade, beneficiary
households only
Risk sharing Autarky
No CCT CCT Diff No CCT CCT Diff
Fraction attending school 0.69 0.94 0.25 0.65 0.93 0.28
Completed grade at age 19 5.90 7.11 1.21 5.75 7.09 1.34
I provide two pieces of evidence which support that the first effect is present. The
first piece of evidence is provided in Table 24. The increase in enrollment rate is much
larger among the households that were hit by negative income shocks. This suggests
that households with greater borrowing constraints were further away from an efficient
allocation and responded more strongly to the CCT. The second piece of evidence is
obtained by conducting another counterfactual experiment which introduces the same
CCT, but under an environment where the cap on the 9th grade does not bind. In this
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experiment, I force the completed grade at age 12 to be the 2nd grade for every child. As
children continue onward from the 2nd grade, the highest grade level they can complete
before turning 19 is 9th grade. The schooling outcome under this experiment is provided
in Table 25. Again, the differences between the outcomes with and without the CCT in
both the fraction attending school and the completed grade level are smaller under risk
sharing than under autarky. The results of the original CCT experiment hold even when
there is no ceiling effect. However, the difference in the effect of CCT under risk sharing
and autarky is smaller in this experiment than in the original CCT experiment, suggesting
that ceiling effect is also present.
Another interesting observation from the two counterfactual experiments is that hav-
ing risk sharing is much more effective in improving the welfare of households than
having CCT, although the effectiveness of CCT is greater when it comes to improving
schooling outcomes alone. The difference in household welfare under risk sharing and
autarky is 1,156.85 pesos (1,770.81 vs. 2,926.66 pesos). When CCT is introduced to
autarky economy the welfare increases only by 34.36 pesos from 1,770.81 to 1,805.17
pesos.
6 Conclusion
This paper is the first to incorporate school attendance choices into an inter-household
risk-sharing model with limited-commitment constraints. This paper develops and struc-
turally estimates a dynamic risk-sharing model with limited-commitment constraints and
school attendance choices in order to study the effectiveness of informal risk sharing
in smoothing consumption and schooling, and to evaluate CCT programs when inter-
household transfers are allowed. The model considers a village economy comprised of
overlapping generations of heterogeneous households. The model parameters are esti-
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mated by the simulated method of moments matching the observed income, consump-
tion, and child activity choices predicted by the model to those in data from PROGRESA
program in Mexico.
Based on the estimated model, I find that the PROGRESA villages are able to smooth
consumption and schooling against idiosyncratic income shocks effectively through inter-
household transfers. The amount of consumption and children’s school attendance or
labor choices are not significantly affected by idiosyncratic income shocks. In contrast to
this, a counterfactual simulation of an economy under autarky shows that without inter-
household transfers, children’s school attendance and labor choices as well as the amount
of consumption are substantially affected by income shocks. The estimated utility cost of
attending school for children whose schooling was interrupted in the past is substantial.
Therefore, the effect of transitory negative income shocks on children’s school attendance
under autarky accumulates over time, leading to lower schooling outcomes compared
to the outcomes under risk sharing. Under autarky, the fraction attending school is 11
percentage points lower than that with risk sharing and the completed school grade by
age 19 is higher by 0.47 years.
I also conduct counterfactual policy simulations by introducing a CCT program sim-
ilar in design to PROGRESA to the model, both with and without risk sharing. Based
on the counterfactual simulations I find that the effect of the CCT program on schooling
outcomes and the welfare of households is larger under autarky than under risk sharing.
The CCT not only increases net returns from schooling by reducing the opportunity cost
of attending school, but also mitigates the effect of negative income shocks on household
consumption and school attendance. The former effect of the CCT is common under both
risk sharing and autarky. The latter effect of the CCT, however, is negligible under risk
sharing because the allocations under risk sharing were close to efficient even without
the CCT. Moreover, the simulation results show that, under risk sharing, consumption
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volatility increases by 20 percents after the introduction of the CCT because beneficiary
households can rely on the CCT benefit if inter-household transfer becomes unavailable,
and this weakens their voluntary participation incentive to remain in the risk-sharing ar-
rangement. This “crowding-out effect” offsets some of the welfare gains from the CCT
under risk sharing. Overall, the simulation outcomes suggest that the benefits of CCT
may be inflated if the role of inter-household transfers are not taken into account in an
evaluation of CCT programs.
Although consumption risk-sharing models considered in previous studies also cap-
ture the crowding-out effect of public transfers, the model developed in this paper is the
first to study risk sharing and schooling outcomes jointly under CCT programs which
are designed to improve schooling outcomes in particular. This cannot be done without
a model that explicitly models school attendance choices. Moreover, introducing school
attendance choices to a limited-commitment risk-sharing model adds substantial compu-
tational challenges, which I overcome by adopting novel theoretical results and computa-
tional algorithms (Clausen and Strub, 2013; Fella, 2013). This is an equilibrium model,
and the model is simplified in several dimensions (e.g., with a single-child assumption)
to keep computational time manageable. Once computation of the model becomes more
tractable, developing a richer model that allows for more realistic evaluation of CCT pro-
grams in the presence of inter-household transfers would be possible.
There are a number of avenues for future research. First, this paper studies the effect
of an existing program design. Ex-ante evaluation of the alternative CCT program designs
in the presence of inter-household transfers will also be of interest to both researchers and
policymakers. Second, the model considered here assumes a continuum of households,
and thus the analysis was confined to large villages. I plan to conducting similar anal-
ysis for small villages with a model that assumes a finite number of households as was
considered in Ligon, Thomas, and Worrall (2002), Laczó (2008), and Morten (2013).
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A Autarky Problem
I set up an autarky problem for five distinctive lifecycle stages: before a birth occurs
(Stage 1), after birth and before a child is aged 12 (Stage 2), while the child is aged be-
tween 12 and 18 (Stage 3), after the child finishes schooling and before a migration occurs
(Stage 4), and finally, after a migration occurs (Stage 5). In autarky, households maximize
their present discounted value of lifetime utility given their period budget constraint,
ci,t = yhi,t
There is no saving or borrowing. Autarky problem is presented in functional equations,
and autarky value functions will be denoted by UAutL,S where L = 1, ...,5 is a subscript for
a lifecycle stage and S ∈ f all,spring is a subscript for a semester. Households in Stage
3 make a child activity choice. Households in other stages simply consume yhi,t . Parental
type is invariant throughout the lifecycle of a household and is omitted from the equations.
• In Stage 5 households’ lifetime utility under autarky is given by,
UAut5, f all(si,t) = u(y
h
i,t)+δEst+1
[
UAut5,spring(si,t+1)
]
UAut5,spring(si,t) = u(y
h
i,t)+δ (1−πd)Est+1
[
UAut5, f all(si,t+1)
]
• In Stage 4,
UAut4, f all(si,t ,X
c
i ,ctype) = u(y
h
i,t)+δEst+1
[
UAut4,spring(si,t+1,X
c
i ,ctype)
]
53
UAut4,spring(si,t ,X
c
i ,µ
c
i ) = u(y
h
i,t)+δ
{
(1−πm)Est+1|migrate=0
[
UAut4, f all(si,t+1,X
c
i ,µ
c
i )
]
+
πmEst+1|migrate=1
[
UAut5, f all(si,t+1)
]}
where ctype is a child type.
• In Stage 3, when the age of a child is a,
UAut3,a, f all(si,t ,d
school
i,t−1 ,X
c
i,t) = max
di,t
{
u(yhi,t)+δEst+1
[
UAut3,a,spring(si,t+1,d
school
i,t ,X
c
i,t)
]}
and in the spring, if a < 18,
UAut3,a,spring(si,t ,d
school
i,t−1 ,X
c
i,t) =
max
di,t
{
u(yhi,t)+δEst+1
[
UAut3,a+1, f all(si,t+1,d
school
i,t ,X
c
i,t+1)
]}
and if a = 18,
UAut3,a=18,spring(si,t ,d
school
i,t−1 ,X
c
i,t) =
max
di,t
{
u(yhi,t)+δEst+1
[
UAut4, f all(si,t+1,X
c
i,t+1,ctype)
]}
• In Stage 2,
UAut2,a, f all(si,t) = u(y
h
i,t)+δEst+1
[
UAut2,a,spring(si,t+1)
]
and in the spring, if a < 11,
UAut2,a,spring(si,t) = u(y
h
i,t)+δEst+1
[
UAut2,a, f all(si,t+1)
]
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and if a = 11,
UAut2,a,spring(si,t) = u(y
h
i,t)+δEst+1
[
UAut3,a+1, f all(si,t+1,d
school
i,t = 1,X
c
i,t+1)
]
• In Stage 1,
UAut1, f all(si,t) = u(y
h
i,t)+δEst+1
[
UAut1,spring(si,t+1)
]
UAut1,spring(si,t) = u(y
h
i,t)+δ
{
(1−πb)Est+1|birth=0
[
UAut1, f all(si,t+1)
]
+
πbEst+1|birth=1
[
UAut0,2, f all(si,t+1)
]}
B Solution Algorithm for the Agent’s Problem
In this subsection, I describe the numerical solution algorithm for the agent’s problem.
For the computation, the supports of ε p, εh, εw, and ξ are discretized. The elements
in the discretized supports will be denoted by ε̄ p,ε̄h, ε̄w, and ξ̄ in the remainder of this
section. The minimum and the maximum value of the discretized support of each shock
variable are given by −3σ and +3σ respectively where σ is the standard deviation of a
given variable. To obtain the right-hand side of (V P) constraints, the autarky problems
are solved first. Given the autarky value functions, the agent’s problem is solved by the
following procedure.
1. Discretize the support of promised utility ω for each state, Ω:
(a) The lower bound of ω grid is given by the corresponding autarky value
(b) The upper bound is given by the discounted lifetime utility associated with
household consumption equivalent to the largest possible yh in every period
and the largest possible ξ̄ and Xc values
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(c) A uniform grid of logω with the given lower and upper bounds is constructed.
2. Choose an initial guess of R:26
(a) The lower bound of R is given by (1−πm)
1
2
(b) The upper bound of R is given by 1
δ (1−πd)
.
3. Given R, solve the agent’s problem for Stage 4 and 5. Iterate value functions until
they converge. This is a direct application of Krueger and Perri (2011).
4. Given V4, f all(·), solve Stage 3 problems by using backward induction starting from
the spring of age 18.27
(a) Given each choice of dt , solve the following problem:
V3,a=18,spring(ωt ,Ωt |dt) =
min
ht ,{ωt+1(Ωt+1)}∀Ωt+1
{
C(ht ,dt)−wtdworkt + (6)
1
R ∑
Ωt+1
Pr(Ωt+1|Ωt ,dt)V 4, f all(ωt+1(Ωt+1),Ωt+1)
}
subject to
ωt = ht +δEΩt+1|Ωt ,dt [ωt+1(Ωt+1)] ∀Ωt+1
ωt+1(Ωt+1)≥ EΩt+1|Ωt ,dt
[
UAutt+1(Ωt+1)
]
∀Ωt+1.
26The lower and upper bounds of R are the smallest and the largest value with which the discounted sum
of the agent’s cost is bounded and the convergence of the value functions in Stage 1, 4, and 5 are ensured
27I ignore εwand ξ throughout this section for the simplicity of the presentation of the algorithm. In
practice, these shocks have to be included as state variables whenever needed.
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Here,
{ωt+1(Ωt+1)}∀Ωt+1 = {ωt+1(ε̄
h,X ,ctype = low),ωt+1(ε̄h,X ,ctype = high),
ωt+1(ε̄
h,X +1,ctype = low),ωt+1(ε̄h,X +1,ctype = high)}∀ε̄h
Optimal ht and {ωt+1(Ωt+1)}∀Ωt+1 can be found by the first order condition:28
∂V4, f all(ω∗t+1,Ωt+1)
∂ωt+1
= Rδ
∂C(h∗t ,dt)
∂ht
ωt+1(Ωt+1) = ω
∗
t+1 for all Ωt+1 that (V P) does not bind, and ωt+1(Ωt+1) =
UAut4, f all(Ωt+1) otherwise.
29
(b) Then, choose dt that minimizes V3,a=18,spring(ωt ,Ωt |dt).
5. Solve the agent’s problem in the fall of age 18. Given each choice of dt , the structure
of the problem is the same as in (6) but with V 3,a=18,spring(ωt+1(Ωt+1),Ωt+1) as the
continuation value function. Here,
{ωt+1(Ωt+1)}∀Ωt+1 = {ωt+1(ε̄
p)}∀ε̄ p
Note that the continuation value function, V3,a=18,spring(ωt+1(Ωt+1),Ωt+1), con-
tains a non-differentiable point along the dimension of ωt+1 due to a discrete school
28In the spring of age 18, the continuation value function, V4, f all(·), is convex and differentiable because
the Stage 4 problem does not involve any discrete choice. Thus, the solutions can be found from the first
order condition given a choice of dt . Multiple events occur between the end of age 18 and the beginning of
Stage 4: (1) the grade failure or completion is determined; (2) given the final school grade, the child type
is drawn; (3) ε̄h is drawn. Thus, for each given ε̄h, there are four different states that the promised utility
needs to be assigned.
29Because ε̄h is i.i.d., as long as (V P) does not bind, the same promised utility value is assigned for all
ε̄h states. For
∂V4, f all(ω∗t+1,Ωt+1)
∂ωt+1
I use the derivative of C(·) at the optimal level of ht+1 which is obtained in
the fall of Stage 4 (envelope condition). Because ω∗t+1 is usually not on the ωt+1 grid, I interpolate for an
optimal ht+1 value which is associated with (ω∗t+1,Ωt+1).
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attendance choice which will be made in the spring of age 18.30
(a) Given a choice of dt , identify a non-convex interval in V3,a=18,Spring(ωt+1, ·).
Specifically, find the points on the ωt+1 grid where the non-convex interval
begins and ends.
(b) (Endogenous grid method) For some ωct+1 which is on the ωt+1 grid and is
contained in the convex interval, find hct that satisfies the first order condi-
tion31:
∂V3,a=18,spring(ωct+1,Ωt+1)
∂ωt+1
= Rδ
∂C(hct ,dt)
∂ht
For Ωt+1 in which (V P) does not bind ωt+1(Ωt+1) = ωct+1. Otherwise,
ωt+1(Ωt+1) =UAut3,age=18,Spring(Ωt+1).
Then, back out ωct using (PK),
ω
c
t = h
c
t +δ ∑
Ωt+1
Pr(Ωt+1|Ωt ,dt)ωt+1(Ωt+1)
Note that ωct may not be a point on the ωt grid.
32 Compute the cost of deliv-
ering ωct , V3,a=18, f all(ω
c
t ,Ωt |dt).
(c) For some point ωnct+1 which is on the ωt+1 grid and is contained in the non-
convex interval, do the same as above.33 Back out ωnct which is associated
30The continuation value is EΩt+1|εw,ξ [V3,a=18,spring(ωt+1(Ωt+1),Ωt+1, ·)], but I will ignore {ε
w,ξ} as I
mentioned in the earlier footnote.
31The first order condition given here is well defined because V3,age=18,Spring is differentiable at the solu-
tion to this first order condition, ω∗t+1, given a point ω
∗
t (Clausen & Strub, 2013).
32The reason I use the endogenous grid method instead of solving for a set of optimal {ωt+1} given ωt is
because when numerically solving for {ωt+1}, the solver may step into the non-convex interval, in which
case the numerical solver does not function well.
33The derivative
∂V3,a=18,spring(ωnct+1,Ωt+1)
∂ωt+1
is well-defined and the envelope condition also holds because the
optimal solution is always found on the smooth part of the objective function (Clausen and Strub, 2013).
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with ωnct+1 and compute V3,a=18, f all(ω
nc
t ,Ωt |dt). However, since ωnct+1 is con-
tained in a non-convex interval, the first order condition is necessary but not
sufficient. Thus, given ωnct , we need to check whether {hnct ,ωnct+1} minimizes
the cost of delivering ωnct .
(d) Given ωnct solve the agent’s problem using a grid-search method searching
over the ωt+1 grid. If {hnct ,ωnct+1} indeed minimizes the agent’s cost given
ωnct , keep the pair (ω
nc
t ,V3,a=18, f all(ω
nc
t ,Ωt |dt)). Otherwise, discard the pair.
(e) Do this for all the points on the ωt+1 grid.
(f) Then, using the pairs, (ωt ,V3,a=18, f all(ωt , ·)) obtained in the above steps, in-
terpolate V3,a=18, f all(ωt ,Ωt |dt) over ωt grid. See Fella (2013) for more details
about and applications of this algorithm.
6. Solve the agent’s problem in the spring of age 17. Given each choice of dt , the struc-
ture of the problem is the same as in (6) but with V 3,a=18, f all(ωt+1(Ωt+1),Ωt+1) as
the continuation value function. Here,
{ωt+1(Ωt+1)}∀Ωt+1 = {ωt+1(ε̄
p,Xt+1 = Xt),ωt+1(ε̄ p,Xt+1 = Xt +1)}∀ε̄ p
Unfortunately, the endogenous grid method which was used to solve the agent’s
problem in the fall of age 18 is not adequate here. This is because the method
cannot be applied when there are more than one continuous choice variables. To
circumvent this issue, I break the problem into three stages, each of which involve
only one continuous choice variable.
(a) In the first stage, the agent only decides how much of ωt should be delivered
as the current period utility, ht , and how much should be postponed to the next
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period as a form of promised utility, ωt+1:
V3,age=17,spring(ωt ,Ωt |dt) = min
ht ,ω
(1)
t+1
C(ht ,dt)+
1
R
V (1)3,age=18, f all(ω
(1)
t+1,Ωt |dt)
subject to
ωt = ht +δω
(1)
t+1
ω
(1)
t+1 ≥ ∑
Ωt+1
Pr(Ωt+1|Ωt ,dt)UAut3,age=18,Spring(Ωt+1)
where V (1)3,age=18, f all(ω
(1)
t+1) comes from the second-stage problem which is de-
scribed below in 6-(b).
(b) In the second-stage problem, the agent allocates ω(1)t+1 across the two states,
grade failure (Xt+1 = Xt) or completion (Xt+1 = Xt +1):
V (1)3,age=18, f all(ω
(1)
t+1,Ωt |dt) =
min
ω
(2)
t+1(Xt),ω
(2)
t+1(Xt+1)
{
πgrV
(2)
3,age=18, f all(ω
(2)
t+1(Xt +1),Xt+1 = Xt +1,Ωt |dt)
+(1−πgr)V (2)3,age=18, f all(ω
(2)
t+1(Xt),Xt+1 = Xt ,Ωt |dt)
}
subject to,
ω
(1)
t+1 = πgrω
(2)
t+1(Xt +1)+(1−πgr)ω
(2)
t+1(Xt)
ω
(2)
t+1(Xt+1)≥ ∑
Ωt+1
Pr(Ωt+1|Ωt ,dt)UAut3,age=18,spring(Ωt+1) for Xt+1 = Xt ,Xt +1
where πgr is the probability that the child completes a school grade and
V (2)3,age=18, f all comes from the third-stage problem which is described below.
(c) In the third-stage problem, the agent determines the allocation of {ω(3)t+1(ε̄ p)}ε̄ p
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given Xt+1 and ω
(2)
t+1(Xt+1):
V (2)3,age=18, f all(ω
(2)
t+1(Xt+1),Xt+1,Ωt |dt) =
min
{ω(3)t+1(ε̄ p)}ε̄ p
∑
ε̄ p
Pr(Ωt+1|ε̄ p,Xt+1,dt)V3,age=18, f all(ω
(3)
t+1(ε̄
p),Ωt+1)
subject to,
ω
(2)
t+1(Xt+1) = ∑
ε̄ p
Pr(ε̄ p)ω(3)t+1(ε̄
p)
ω
(3)
t+1(ε̄
p)≥UAut3,age=18, f all(Ωt+1|ε̄
p,Xt+1,dt) for all ε̄ p
(d) I use the endogenous grid method for the first-stage problem and the grid
search method for the second- and the third-stage problems. It turns out that
a coarse grid in the second- and the third-stage problems leads to failure in
finding R that satisfies (RC). Because the problem is solved by backward
induction, the third-stage problem is solved first and the first stage the last.
7. Continue to solve the agent’s problem to age 0 by backward induction. Then, given
the value function at age 0, V2,age=0, f all(ωt), solve the Stage 1 problems using the
value function iteration.
8. Compute the stationary distribution Φ(Ω)34.
(a) Denote Φ(0)1, f all to be the initial distribution over the set of {ωt , ε̄t
p} in the fall
of Stage 1. Obtain Φ(0)1,spring over {ωt+1, ε̄
p
t+1} by updating ωt+1 using the
optimal solution found by solving the agent’s problem.
(b) At the end of the spring, households of measure πb experience a birth and exit
to Stage 2. Also, the new households of measure πb enter the village. Update
34Φ(Ω) is village specific. The solution of the agent’s problem also differs across different villages
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Φ
(1)
1, f all using the optimal solution. Assign the same {ωt+1, ε̄
p
t+1} distribution
to the new households.
(c) Repeat until Φ(n)1, f all ≈ Φ
(n+1)
1, f all . For (1−πm)
1
2 < R < 1
δ (1−πd)
, there exists a
unique stationary distribution Φ∗1, f all (Krueger and Perri, 2011).
(d) Given Φ∗1, f all the distribution over the households in different life-cycle stages
is computed by updating the distribution using the optimal solution of the
agent’s problem.
9. Compute the excess demand and update R.
(a) Simulate household consumption and income and compute the excess de-
mand (village aggregate consumption - village aggregate income including
children’s wage income) using the stationary distribution.
(b) If the excess demand is positive, decrease R. If it is negative, increase R. I use
a bisection method.
10. Repeat from step 1 to step 9 until the excess demand becomes close to zero.
C Household Consumption and Income Variables
C.1 Consumption
Consumption measures are consistent throughout the three data waves of October 1998,
May 1999, and November 1999. The data contains detailed information on food con-
sumption and non-food expenditures by category.
Households report their weekly food consumption during the week prior to the sur-
vey on a recall basis. For each item, they report the quantity consumed, quantity pur-
chased, expenditure on the purchase, and the quantity of home-produced goods that were
62
consumed within the household.35 I obtain the unit price of each item by dividing the
expenditure on the purchase by the quantity purchased. Then, the weekly food consump-
tion variable was constructed by multiplying the unit price and the quantity consumed
(including the home-produced goods) for each item and then adding up the values for all
food items. When the expenditure variable is missing so that the actual unit price paid
by a household is not available, I use the village median price if there are more than 20
households through which the unit price could be computed. If there are fewer than 20
households providing available prices, I use the municipal median price; if the number of
the available prices in a municipal is less than 20, the province median price is used. Fi-
nally, the semiannual household food consumption variable is constructed by multiplying
the weekly food consumption variable by 26.
The non-food expenditure category includes transportation in the past week; electric-
ity, fuel, hygienic products, medication, and school fees in the past month; and house-
hold utensils, home and personal accessories, clothing, shoes, toys, transportation, school
supplies, ceremonies, and expenditures on home improvement in the past six months. I
convert the weekly expenditure and monthly expenditures to a semiannual expenditure by
multiplying by 26 and 6 respectively. The non-food expenditure variable is constructed
as the sum of semiannual expenditures on the all non-food categories.
Household consumption is the sum of the food consumption and non-food expendi-
ture variables. Inflation is adjusted by the monthly CPI. I use the price in October 1998
as a base; May 1999 and November 1999 values were deflated by 1.10998 and 1.1392
respectively.
35Items in the food consumption survey are the following. The “fruit and vegetable” category includes
tomatoes, onions, potatoes, carrots, leafy vegetables, oranges, bananas, apples, lemons, and pears. The
“grain” category includes corn, maize, bread, flour, pasta, rice, cookies, and beans. The “meat and dairy”
includes chicken, beef, pork, sheep, goat, fish, seafood, canned fish, eggs, milk, and cheese. The “industry
goods” category includes coffee, sugar, alcohol, vegetable oil, and refreshments.
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Table 26: Income by source (in 1998 pesos)
Source October 1998 May 1999 November 1999
Wage 5281.5 (7399.3) 3984.6 (5420.1) 5154.2 (6479.0)
Crop production 1987.0 (8001.8) 1022.4 (5021.7) -
Livestock 42.8 (750.6) 23.2 (524.2) -
Sales of service 175.8 (1932.0) 75.5 (744.2) 32.3 (463.8)
Public transfer 354.0 (956.4) 295.6 (799.6) 259.5 (779.1)
Other 90.98 (946.0) 57.9 (657.6) 760.5 (3903.0)
Observations 7,405 5,307 5,661
Source: PROGRESA data from October 1998, May 1999, and November 1999. Control villages
data only. Other income includes pensionss, interest payment, rent, and income from community
gains. The number of observations indicates the number of households that had non-missing
observations for all income categories.
C.2 Income
Household income is constructed by finding the sum of the wage income of household
members, the crop production and livestock income, and the income from other sources
such as rent, public program transfers, and the sales of the services of household members.
Table 26 provides the mean and the standard deviation of income from different sources.
In the wage income category, for every household member above age 6, the number
of days worked in the past week of the survey, the number of weeks worked in the past
month, and the amount and frequency of the wages received are reported. The wage rate
is calculated using the information about the amount of wages received and the frequency
of the payment. The number of days worked in the past week and the number of weeks
worked in the past month are also available. Using the calculated wage rate and the days
and weeks worked, the monthly wage rate is computed. For example, when the weekly
wage rate is available for a given individual, and the individual worked for 3 weeks in
the past week, then the monthly wage income is the product of the weekly wage rate
multiplied by 3 weeks. Monthly wage income is then multiplied by 6 and converted into
64
a semiannual wage income.
The October 1998 and May 1999 waves also contain detailed information about crop
and livestock production. For each plot used for crop cultivation, the type of crop, quantity
sold, quantity harvested, income from the crop sales, and the expenditure on inputs such as
fertilizer, seeds, insecticides, machinery, and labor are reported. Crop production income
is computed by subtracting the total expenditure on production inputs from the value of
the total quantity harvested. The value of the harvest for each type of crop is calculated by
multiplying the unit price by the quantity harvested. I use the producer prices published
by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations for the corresponding
years of 1998 and 1999. (I use the value of harvest rather than the sales value because
sales do not account for the amount that is unsold and instead left for consumption.) I
impute the missing observations for the expenditures on inputs by running a regression
of the observed expenditures on the characteristics of the production, such as the type
of crop, size of the cultivation area, and municipal dummies. The regression result is
reported in Table 27. For those households which did not own any plots or did not use
any plots for cultivation, income from crop production is set to zero.
The November 1999 wave did not survey income from crop and livestock production.
Instead, the survey included another subcategory for income from the sales of product
in other income category. As shown in Table 26, the amount of income in other income
category is substantially larger in November 1999 compared to that of October 1998 and
May 1999 waves although the amount is smaller than the income from crop and livestock
production in the two waves. This may be because the income from the sales of product
does not include the value for the produce consumed within the household.
Parental income is the total household income minus the sum of the child wage in-
come.
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Table 27: Regression of the log expenditures on crop production inputs
October 1998 May 1999
Dependent variable Coefficient (s.e.) Coefficient s.e.
total cultivation area 0.0116 (0.0124) 0.0516 (0.0421)
irrigated area 0.0231 (0.0657) -0.0376 (0.0658)
family owned area 0.0367 (0.0028) 0.0727 (0.0045)
rent area -0.0178 (0.0159) 0.0439 (0.0357)
corn 0.1009 (0.0633) 0.1805 (0.0688)
corn area -0.0111 (0.0124) -0.0517 (0.0142)
corn irrigated area 0.0089 (0.0635) 0.0320 (0.0648)
beans 0.2646 (0.0275) 0.2039 (0.0358)
beans area -0.0004 (0.0005) -0.0002 (0.0008)
beans irrigated area 0.0188 (0.0233) 0.0575 (0.0320)
tomato 0.6425 (0.1803) 0.3655 (0.3006)
tomato area -0.0012 (0.0011) -0.0532 (0.1011)
tomato irrigated area 0.1158 (0.1573) 0.3126 (0.2150)
pumpkin -0.0440 (0.1407) -0.0072 (0.1262)
pumpkin area 0.0309 (0.0275) 0.0054 (0.0148)
pumpkin irrigated area -0.0352 (0.0908) -0.3145 (0.3359)
chickpea 0.0499 (0.3406) 0.9729 (0.7593)
chickpea area -0.0295 (0.0613) -0.2254 (0.2353)
chickpea irrigated area 0.2620 (0.2043) -0.5883 (0.9868)
wheat 0.0930 (0.3222) 0.3263 (0.2836)
wheat area 0.1417 (0.0877) -0.0761 (0.0444)
wheat irrigated area -0.0943 (0.2213) 0.0983 (0.1650)
rice 0.1713 (0.7023) -0.0623 (2.2196)
rice area 0.0265 (0.1312) -0.0011 (0.6745)
rice irrigated area 0.2569 (0.2841) - -
coffee 0.4191 (0.0745) 0.5073 (0.0754)
coffee area -0.0150 (0.0130) 0.0239 (0.0160)
coffee irrigated area 0.3143 (0.3383) -0.0616 (0.0689)
continued
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fruit 0.5025 (0.1458) 0.7269 (0.0986)
fruit area 0.0046 (0.0319) -0.0647 (0.0103)
fruit irrigated area 0.1268 (0.0842) 0.1200 (0.0665)
sugarcane 1.2394 (0.0995) 1.3903 (0.1250)
sugarcane area 0.0303 (0.0131) -0.0498 (0.0173)
sugarcane irrigated area 0.2052 (0.0973) 0.1683 (0.1233)
chilli 0.3088 (0.2483) 0.5370 (0.2038)
chilli area -0.0543 (0.0783) -0.0225 (0.0362)
chilli irrigated area -0.0670 (0.1651) 0.0917 (0.0756)
potato 0.5793 (0.1997) 0.3508 (0.2434)
potato area -0.0065 (0.0223) 0.0187 (0.0503)
potato irrigated area 0.6545 (0.2128) 0.0679 (0.1850)
other crops 0.5254 (0.0540) 0.3686 (0.0838)
other crops area 0.0005 (0.0010) -0.0059 (0.0148)
other crops irrigated area 0.0063 (0.0330) 0.0389 (0.0657)
municipal fixed effect yes yes
R-squared 0.3249 0.3137
Observations 11,273 7,794
Source: PROGRESA data from October 1998, May 1999, and November 1999. Both
treatment and control villages data are used. Standard errors are in the parenthesis. For
example, "Corn" is a 0-or-1 indicator variable that shows whether a household cultivated
corn during the period. "Corn area" is the area of the plot that is used for the cultivation of
corn. "Corn irrigated area" is the area of the irrigated plot that is used for corn.
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